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 References to mysticism abound in Paul Tillich’s theology; and indeed Tillich  
 
insists on the presence of a mystical element in all religion.  Yet quite unlike the situation  
 
of another thinker well-associated with mysticism, William James, biographers of Tillich  
 
have largely neglected the question of links between his life experiences and his interest  
 
in mysticism.  Nor does Tillich himself explicitly draw such ties beyond brief comments  
 
on nature and on the holy in My Search for Absolutes.  But significant and varied  
 
connections do exist.  So this project takes up the biographical task of examining how  
 
Tillich’s life experiences encouraged him to valorize mysticism and to construe the  
 
mystical in the manner he did.  This project will also involve theological analysis and  
 
evaluation with relevant references to Tillich’s theology and my own reflections on  
 
Tillich’s life in relation to his thought.  It draws especially upon the well-regarded  
 
biographies by Wilhelm and Marian Pauck and by David Hopper as well as Tillich’s  
 




 In relation to both Tillich’s life experiences and theology, the intellectual milieu  
 
of German Romantic idealism with its mystical tendencies, and more particularly the  
 
thought of Schelling and, through Schelling, Boehme (Thomas 45-46), of course lie in the  
 
background.  The mystically formative concrete events and experiences fall into three  
 
main categories: 1) nature  2) World War I  and  3) art. 
 
 Consonant with German Romantic fascination with nature were Tillich’s own  
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encounters with the natural world.  He recalls “actual communication with nature daily in 
 
my early years,” including many “memorable instances of ‘mystical participation’”  
 
(1967). The natural settings for this communication included sailing, hiking through the  
 
Brandenberg countryside, and activities in the family garden (Pauck & Pauck 11). The  
 
ocean constituted for Tillich an especially powerful source for communion with nature  
 
and its source.  Already at the age of eight Tillich wrestled with the idea of infinity while  
 
gazing upon the Baltic Sea (Pauck & Pauck 8).  We might label this Tillich’s “oceanic”  
 
experience! In On the Boundary he reveals that “the infinite bordering on the finite suited  
 
my inclination toward the boundary situation.” It provided an imaginative element for  
 
conceiving of  “the Absolute as both ground and abyss of dynamic truth” (18; see also  
 
30).  (These early mystical experiences with nature offer an interesting counterpoint to  
 
Tillich’s later musings about mysticism in relation to art: Courbet’s painting, Wave,  
 
evoked from Tillich the exclamation that he “never really saw the ocean” before!  
 
[1987:148].) In My Search Tillich explains his disagreement with Ritschlian theology’s  
 
postulate of  an “infinite gap between nature” and the human personality, allowing “no  
 
mystical participation in nature, no understanding” of its “finite expression of the infinite  
 
ground, no vision of the divine-demonic conflict in nature.” (25). In the same work he  
 
casts his vote for the “infra-Lutheranum” over  the “extra-Calvinisticum,” because the  
 
former affirms for Tillich “the presence of the infinite in everything finite,”  “that nature  
 
mysticism is possible and real.” (26).  Not surprisingly Schelling wins praise from Tillich  
 
for expressing the import of these encounters with nature:  Schelling’s philosophy of  
 
nature “became the direct expression of my feeling for nature.” (1966:17). 
 
 We can hardly underestimate the influence of World War I on Paul Tillich.  It  
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represented both personal emotional collapse (in today’s terminology Tillich suffered  
 
from post-traumatic stress syndrome) and a collapse of modern German—and in some  
 
ways modern Western—society.  So we should expect it would have profound influence  
 
on his theology and on his perspective on mysticism.  To facilitate consideration of  
 
World War I’s effect on Tillich, I will utilize William James’ categories of religious  
 
personality: the healthy-minded or once-born soul versus the sick soul or divided self  
 
driven to achieve integration through a “second birth.”  Besides the positive experiences  
 
of nature we have discussed, Tillich’s childhood also offered intellectual challenges and  
 
successes, a comfortable relationship with his father’s churches, and a generally happy  
 
family life.  On this latter score, by all accounts Tillich received unconditional love from  
 
his mother, whom he adored.  While fear was a definite ingredient in his relationship with  
 
his father (Pauck & Pauck 30) and he repressed his mother’s death from the age of  
 
seventeen (Pauck & Pauck 14), Tillich entered young adulthood as a fundamentally  
 
healthy-minded and untroubled self.  In so doing, Tillich’s life paralleled the optimistic,  
 
once-born self-assessment of the German culture and culture Protestantism of that time.   
 
But Tillich’s World War I service as a military chaplain profoundly changed matters.   
 
 Tillich eventually had bouts with depression and anxiety that left him unable to  
 
function.  But long before these, Tillich wrote from the front lines, “True experience has  
 
its roots in suffering and happiness is a blossom which opens itself up only now and  
 
then.” (Pauck & Pauck 43).  As the extent of the carnage grew, Tillich indicated that he  
 
no longer thought of his own death but that death’s force gripped his whole being (Pauck  
 
& Pauck 46).  When a friend was killed, Tillich managed to do the funeral liturgy but  
 
found himself incapable of preaching (Pauck & Pauck 51). Though it was not as terrible  
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as the first, when Tillich endured his second major episode of depression and anxiety, the  
 
repetition caused him to write that he “could not stand it any more.”  He also penned,  
 
“Body and soul are broken and can never be entirely repaired …” (Pauck & Pauck 54).   
 
(Note the parallel to James’ depressive incidents in young adulthood, albeit the apparent  
 
causes in James had more to due with internal brain chemistry than with external events.)  
 
In relation to Schelling’s thought Tillich now saw the lack of an adequate tragic element,  
 
an element for which he had seen no need due to the once-born nature of his prior life. 
 
Hopper quotes Tillich from his Interpretation of History :  
 
The World War in my own experience was the catastrophe of idealistic thinking  
 
in general.  Even Schelling’s philosophy was drawn into this catastrophe. …. If a  
 
reunion of theology and philosophy should again become possible, it could be  
 
achieved only in such a way as would do justice to this experience of the abyss of  
 
our existence. (30[35]) 
 
The eight and one-half million dead and twenty-one million wounded of World War I  
 
exacted their toll on many.  World War I changed Tillich into a “sick soul,” a divided  
 
self, ready for a twice-born experience of transformation.  Art would provide the context  
 
for precisely that kind of experience. 
 
 Tillich did recognize the importance of art for his theology of culture but only  
 
rarely connected it explicitly to his own valorization of the mystical.  I will argue that art  
 
became his template for transformation in a mystical vein through the interplay of form  
 
and substance or import, both for his personal faith and for his theology.  Growing up  
 
Tillich already had a type of mystical experience through art, more specifically  
 
architecture, but lacked the tools to put it into words at the time.  Living between a  
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Lutheran school and a beautiful Gothic church, Tillich experienced what he later  
 
identified as “the holy,” “an indestructible good” (1967:28).  Indeed, Tillich immediately  
 
understood Rudolph Otto’s Idea of the Holy in light of those experiences.  Furthermore,  
 
his reflections on the implications of the holy while reading Otto led him to a positive  
 
“reevaluation of Christian and non-Christian mysticism.” (1967:28-29).   Interestingly,  
 
Tillich had an early interest in becoming an architect (Scharlemann 157). 
 
 Tillich’s decisive experience relative to art and mysticism occurred on his last  
 
furlough of World War I, which overlapped the end of that terrible War.  He had turned  
 
to studying magazines and books with classic works of art to provide some sense of hope  
 
and beauty, some link to sanity, in the midst of the despair and ugliness of the Western  
 
front.  One of the works he had viewed in the trenches was Botticelli’s “Madonna with  
 
Singing Angels.”  Tillich now rushed into the Kaiser Friedrich Museum to view the  
 
original. The setting of the painting called attention to the work: it hung alone on the wall  
 
opposite the entrance (Pauck & Pauck 76).  Gazing up at it, an ultimate meaning grasped  
 
Tillich.  The traditional religious content (Inhalt) had nothing to do with this effect.   
 
Rather the form(s) of the colors and their spatial arrangement became the vehicle for  
 
experiencing a divine depth content (Gehalt).  Recollecting this moment for Parade  
 
magazine in 1955, Tillich wrote, “ … Beauty itself … shone through the colors of the  
 
paint as the light of day shines through the stained-glass windows of a medieval church. 
 
….  I turned away shaken.”  (Note the architectural reference.)  Tillich concluded, “I  
 
know now that the picture is not the greatest.  I have seen greater since then.  But that  
 
moment of ecstasy has never been repeated.”  It constituted for Tillich a second birth that  
 
“brought vital joy and spiritual truth” to a sick soul.  It also gave to him “the keys for the  
 
 6 




 Several features of this experience became keys for Tillich’s theology, especially  
 
for his theology of mystical experience.  I will highlight them now as denouement to my  
 
consideration of this life-changing event and as prelude to wider treatment of Tillich’s  
 
theology of mysticism and art.  Tillich understood this as an ecstatic experience, where  
 
one stands outside of oneself, indeed where one experiences  a unity beyond the ordinary  
 
subject-object structure.  It entails a breakdown of or a breaking through the normal  
 
perception and understanding of forms and their sense.  At the same time perception of  
 
form is transformed rather than superceded—the forms remain a necessary and vital part  
 
of the experience.  
 
 Despite his many published articles and lectures on religion and art, Tillich never  
 
systematically developed his theology of mysticism and art.  While still pastor at Moabit,  
 
he did speak on “The Mysticism of Art and Religious Mysticism” (Pauck & Pauck 37). 
 
Unfortunately the content of that speech is not extant.  That he titled his presentation that  
 
way, though, does suggest the importance of art for Tillich’s understanding of mysticism. 
 
Robert Scharlemann (162-63) and John Dillenger (xxii-xxiii) have noted the variations in  
 
Tillich’s typologies of art which all revolve around artistic styles and their respective  
 
conduciveness or non-conduciveness for revelation of the divine.  Tillich varied his  
 
approach depending upon context, realizing that an absolute scheme of categorization  
 
was neither possible nor desirable.  Nevertheless, despite much variety in terminology  
 
and sometimes major shifts in his assessments of individual artists and movements  
 
representative of certain styles, I will argue that an underlying consistency runs through  
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Tillich’s oeuvre on artistic style.  Indeed, some of the tensions, polarities, or dialectics in  
 
his analysis of style themselves constitute consistent features of  that analysis. 
 
 In a nutshell, artistic style determines the interplay of form and substance.  To  
 
elaborate, form potentially interacts with substance on two levels: the ordinary or surface  
 
content (Inhalt) and the extraordinary, depth content (Gehalt).  An important background  
 
note to keep in mind:  for Tillich any finite reality can become the vehicle of revelation  
 
for someone.  So when we theologically analyze artistic styles, we presume a certain  
 
modesty:  some styles are more conducive than others for intuiting the divine, and some  
 
styles indeed put up barriers to revelation; but no style or individual painting   
 
automatically disqualifies itself from the possibility of becoming the vehicle for an  
 
ecstatic experience.  
 
 Certain realistic or naturalistic styles call attention to their finite content in and of  
 
itself.  Some of these also have idealizing elements that exaggerate the present reality or  
 
depict the future glory of the subject matter.  But the key point is that this idealized  
 
reality does not depend upon the infinite divine but possesses its being and glory through  
 
and by itself.  This is the “self-sufficient finitude” Tillich decried. This kind of realism  
 
does not look beyond itself as does a critical or prophetic realism.  For most of his career  
 
Tillich criticized impressionism for that kind of attitude, for limiting itself to a technical  
 
approach to light and surface and/or for its idealizing of bourgeois life (for example,  
 
1987:61-62).  (Late in his life, though, he had kinder words for impression’s mystical  
 
tendencies, which probably represent a fairer assessment given the continuities between  
 
Cezanne, whom he lionized, and the impressionists [1987:146, 187].)  For Tillich the  
 
worst kind of naturalism took religious symbols as its subject matter but left them in their  
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self-satisfied finitude.  Tillich bristled at such sentimental or complacent kitsch with the  
 
outrage  appropriate to witnessing blasphemy or desecration.  A self-sufficient realism or  
 
naturalism then is the type of artistic style that erects substantial barriers to the  
 
breakthrough of the divine. Significantly, except in his early works, Tillich usually   
 




 Expressionism for Tillich is not just a modern artistic movement centered in  
 
Germany but a style that appears in many periods of history and pre-history.  If the above  
 
realism is the bad-boy of artistic styles, expressionism is the hero.  Expressionistic style  
 
uses forms in a manner that does not restrict our attention to the ordinary content (Inhalt)  
 
but alters forms so as to permit an in-breaking of an infinite depth content (Gehalt)  
 
through the forms.  In Tillich’s words, “The expressive element in a style implies a  
 
radical transformation of the ordinarily encountered reality by using elements of it in a  
 
way which does not exist in the ordinarily encountered reality.  Expression disrupts the  
 
naturally given appearance of things.” (1987:123).  In a similar vein Tillich expounds that  
 
the “expressionistic element”  breaks “the surface of reality,” “it pierces into its ground; it  
 
reshapes it, reorders the elements in order more powerfully to express meaning. It  
 
exaggerates some elements over against others.” (1987:177).  In theonomous periods  
 
(when culture has an integrity whose expression harmonizes with its sense of ultimate  
 
reality), as in primal prehistory and in Byzantine, Romanesque, and Gothic, either  
 
everyday or explicitly religious subject matter can constitute the Inhalt, though with  
 
bending or alteration of form that encourages the divine ground and abyss to break  
 
through for the observer.  Already in “Art and Society,” Tillich identified a “positive  
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expressionistic style” “in which the spiritual substance shines through the natural forms  
 
of reality” (1987:31).  In “Art and Ultimate Reality” Tillich refers to this type of  
 
expressionism as “numinous realism” in relation to primal art. Its depictions make things  
 
“strange, mysterious, laden with an ambiguous power.  It uses space-relations, body  
 
stylization, uncanny expressions for this purpose.” (1987:143ff).  Positive expressionistic  
 
elements also “are effective and even dominating in many styles” of Western religious  
 
art.  In general, expressionism allows “(u)ltimate reality to appear ‘breaking the prison of  
 
our form’ ….  It breaks to pieces the surface of our own being and that of our world.”  
 
(1987:150).  But in theonomous periods it only partially negates:  it also affirms the  
 
Inhalt, the everyday content or traditional symbolic religious content.  
  
 In other periods, especially the modern one, a fundamental harmony between the  
 
culture and the ultimate, the ordinary on the one hand and divine power and purpose on  
 
the other, has vanished.  Meaninglessness constitutes the primary spiritual threat in such a  
 
period.  And here another form of expressionism may come forth.  Here the ordinary  
 
Inhalt of the culture can in no wise be affirmed.  Instead of merely bending the forms of  
 
ordinary reality or even breaking them to a degree  that still allows reintegration, this  
 
expressionism destroys them (though, as we shall see later it is the ordinary perception  
 
and meaning of the forms that is lost, not all form).  In “Art and Society” Tillich referred  
 
to a “negative” or “critical” expressionism that  “shows the demonic, disruptive elements  
 
in the depths of reality, not through their content, but through the style of its creations.”  
 
(1987:31).  (Note that here, common in the early Tillich, “demonic” refers to the abysmal  
 
element in the infinite that resists any attempt by the finite to claim absoluteness for itself 
 
(1987:31).   
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 In his 1922 article, “Mass and Personality,” Tillich discerned a “mystical mass”  
 
embodied in the crowds depicted in theonomous, expressive medieval religious art.   
 
Medieval society constituted a mystical body in this worldview.  Given that culture’s  
 
understanding of its religious symbols, this mysticism, though experienced within the  
 
finite, breaks in transcendentally, from above. With the negative type by contrast, 
 
It is the mass of immanent mysticism that expressionism reveals [emphasis  
 
Tillich’s] ….  The end is linked with the beginning.  A new mystical mass is in  
 
the making, except that the mysticism is not guided supranaturally, from above,  
 
but remains immanent in the reality of this world, breaking forth from the depths  
 
of the soul. (1987:64). 
 
 Some scholars have debated whether the New Realism or “belief-ful realism”  
 
permanently superceded Expressionism for Tillich, whether in terms of a particular  
 
artistic movement or a wider style.  We can find the answer in light of our above  
 
discussion.  Tillich hoped that the modern West might someday regain a theonomous  
 
culture—a culture where art could affirm the symbols of ordinary reality as well as of  
 
more explicitly religious reality, bending them to allow the divine mystically to break 
 
through, rather than a culture that only permitted such a breakthrough through their  
 
destruction.  And initially Tillich believed that the New Realism signaled a positive  
 
breakthrough, where the forms and subject matter depicted could be affirmed in a  
 
culture or subculture becoming theonomous (for example, 1929:65ff; 1956:57ff).  In later  
 
works, however, he doubted that the New Realism had succeeded in that difficult mission  
 
(1987:99,124,152,169-70).  To the question of whether art with both a religious style and  
 
religious content was possible, he answered, “Sometimes … I am willing to say that it is  
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possible.  Sometimes I am not willing to say so.” (1987:98-99).  Regarding  
 
straightforwardly positive religious symbols, Tillich commented even more negatively:  
 
“Symbols such as the resurrection have not found any adequate artistic representation and  
 
so it is with the other traditional ‘symbols of glory.’” (1987:124). Tillich’s last word  
 
regarding theonomous art was, “We cannot force it, as we cannot force the resurrection of  
 
the God who died …” (1987:170). The implication of that apparent failure was that the  
 
most success the New Realism could expect in mid-twentieth century Western culture  
 
was that of Expressionism:  to break down or negate the forms and their ordinary content  
 
enough to allow the infinite depth to shine through.  Interestingly, a comment from  
 
“Ueber die Idee einer Theologie er Kultur” suggests that Tillich believed the  
 




  Thus, a No and a Yes come to expression in great depth in this art.  But  
 
 the No, the form-destroying element, seems to me to have the upper hand  
 
throughout, even though this is not the intention of the artist, for in him there  
 
pulsates a passionate will to a new, unconditional Yes. (41-42) 
 
If we keep in mind that Tillich intended none of his typology to be absolute, that a  
 
particular piece of art usually included several stylistic elements, we realize that typing a  
 
piece or an artistic movement is a matter of degrees.  Thus, whether a work with  
 
expressionistic elements exhibits a bending or even breaking of—while still affirming,  
  
form, content, symbol, sense—versus destroying same is not an all or nothing matter.   
 
We can probably conclude, however, that Tillich eventually came to the judgment that  
 
neither the New Realism nor any other artistic movement on the whole succeeded in both  
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expressing the divine depth content and affirming its own forms and surface content.   
 
And in terms of the broadest typology of artistic styles, numinous realism, theonomous  
 
religious art, Expressionism, and the New Realism are all expressionistic. 
 
 Before we move to the third major type in my analysis of Tillich on art, religion,  
 
and mysticism, I will say a stylistic word about Tillich’s ecstatic, mystical experience of  
 
Botticelli’s Madonna.  In terms of Tillich’s general assessment of Renaissance art, in its  
 
own cultural period the painting would most likely have been received in a realistic  
 
manner, indeed, in a self-sufficient naturalistic mode.  At best, enough expressive  
 
elements might have been accessible so that the Renaissance viewer could have had a  
 
theonomous experience where the ordinary religious content was affirmed while allowing  
 
the divine depth content to break through.  For Tillich, however, the religious content or  
 
Inhalt constituted no part of his experience: that content and the ordinary sense of the  
 
forms were destroyed.  So for Tillich in the twentieth-century, the artistic style that  
 
 
functioned in his apprehension of the Madonna with Singing Angels was a negative  
 
expressionism.   
 
 Given that the two broadest types of artistic style covered thus far entail,  
 
respectively, self-sufficient finite content that neglects the infinite versus expressive finite  
 
content that reveals infinite depth, exhausting the abstract logical possibilities would  
 
leave the following third type of style:  infinite depth that attempts to eliminate finite  
 
content (as much as possible).  I add the parenthetical remark because visual art by its  
 
nature involves an indispensable finite medium.  Only once, in “Art and Ultimate  
 
Reality,” does Tillich explicitly identify this arguably counter-intuitive “mystical” artistic  
 
style (1987:145ff).  Such a style is analogous to “the mystical type” of religion that “tries  
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to reach ultimate reality without the mediation of particular things” (145).  Some variants  
 
of this general mystical style merely dissolve particularities “into a visual continuum,”  
 
hiding but not eliminating the potential particularity of things.  One example Tillich  
 
offers is “Chinese landscapes in which air and water symbolize the cosmic unity, and  
 
individual rocks or branches hardly dare emerge to an independent existence.” (145-46).   
 
We might subsume this variety of “mystical” style under expressionism broadly  
 
construed, in that air and water in this example are altered sufficiently from their natural  
 
appearance to reveal something of the ultimate divine source.  Interestingly, Tillich here  
 
also talks of impressionism as entailing a continuum where things “hardly dare to become  
 
fully individual.” (146).  
 
 A more radical version of mystical style must stand on its own, namely, “non- 
 
objective painting” (146).  In his works that develop the types of religion, Tillich weighs  
 
in with a decisive negative judgment against any form of mysticism that attempts to  
 
utterly transcend or bypass the finite (for example, 1951:140, 1952:186, 1959:28).  Not  
 
only is such an attempt practically impossible—even the most rarefied mystical  
 
experiences are mediated by a tradition and meditative techniques—but also theologically  
 
impossible:  the infinite is never experienced apart from finite mediation or expression in  
 
the finite, for metaphysically the two partake in a dialectical relationship.  In his  
 
“Introduction” to On Art and Architecture, John Dillenger opines that Tillich’s instincts  
 
about Abstract Expressionism “were not negative, but undeveloped.” (xxi).  I suspect  
 
otherwise.  Tillich countenanced the destruction of form in Expressionism precisely in 
 
that it strove for new forms even as it destroyed the old.  Tillich describes an  
 
immanentism in Visual Arts and the Revelatory Character of Style:  
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Not even the elements of encountered reality are any longer of interest but only  
 
the relation of colors in an unordered-ordered geometrical network.  Here the  
 
point is reached in which the physical material of every painting is transformed  
 
itself into a painting.  But this painting does not transcend the material and its  
 
inner relations (1987:137).  
 
And in Religious Dimensions of Contemporary Art he pens, 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of this breaking to pieces, this piercing into the  
 
underground, this distortion and reduction of dimensions, this exaggeration— 
 
expressionism still exhibits artistic form; it discloses the unity of sense  
 
impressions, the unity which embraces a manifoldness.  In this manifoldness, the  
 
whole and the broken, the totality and the parts, are united by the integral act of  
 
the artist in creating his new aesthetic form. (1987:177).  
  
Expressionist style then does not try to outstrip all form.  I surmise that Tillich had  
 
theological qualms about some manifestations of Abstract Expressionism and other  
 
schools of non-objective art of the mid-twentieth century, because they did attempt to use  
 
their minimalist forms in a kind of purely abstract, instrumental manner that involved  
 
their own destruction in order to induce a supposed experience of the naked infinite,  
 
rather than creating a new aesthetic form. 
 
 While John Dourley and Daniel Peterson disagree as to whether God in Boehme’s  
 
thought derives fulfillment from what happens in time, they concur that Boehme, like  
 
Eckhart before him, posits an absolute divine fulfillment belonging to a timeless,  
 
formless dimension—and which humans can also experience in a mystical state that  
 
absolutely surpasses any distinction between subject and object, an utterly unmediated  
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experience of the God beyond God.  In this case, as Dourley puts it, “the abyss which  
 
craves form for its self-completion, would cede to a deeper abyss which does not” (14).  
 
Dourley concludes that Tillich would have taken his theology in a more expansive  
 
direction if he had followed the lead of those two German mystics.  Yet Tillich was  
 
aware of that option and deliberately spurned it.  Instead he threw in his lot with  
 
Schelling: while God as infinite ground and abyss is not limited to any particular finite  
 
forms, neither does God achieve an absolute fulfillment apart from expression in and  
 
through some finite forms.  Tillich’s beatification of expressive artistic style is fully in  
 
keeping with this fundamental theological judgment.  Expressive art participates in the  
 
divine fulfillment through the creation. 
 
 That an explicit mystical experience could occur in the context not only of  
 
nature—obvious in the German Romantic tradition—or of the religious per se, but of  
 
secular art, provided key support for Tillich’s epistemology of a universal mystical  
 
connection with the divine.  This carried Tillich far beyond his early intellectual interest  
 
in the German mystical tradition.  While I have just highlighted the finite as necessary  
 
and substantive for realization of the depths of meaning for both humans and God, I will  
 
now conclude that Tillich’s World War I journey and his appropriation of classical  
 
Christian theology conspired to mute this crucial role for finite form.  (As my theological  
 
mentor, Ronald L. Williams, often proclaimed, “theologians take away with the left hand  
 
what they’ve just given you with the right.”)  While Dourley rightly interprets Tillich’s  
 
understanding of the divine life to always entail the Logos element of form, he regards  
 
Tillich’s notion of essentialization in Volume 3 of the Systematic as a decisive change  
 
whereby Tillich finally allows that creaturely and human forms contribute to divine  
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blessedness and fulfillment (15).  Developed at greater length elsewhere, I would offer a  
 
different interpretation that involves a position consistent with the whole Tillichian  
 
corpus, albeit a position never fully developed in an explicit manner:  whatever finite  
 
forms creatures realize or fail to realize, God overcomes and purges the negative and  
 
makes up in eternity the gap between the creature’s existence and its essential goodness.   
 
In that sense God’s fulfillment in and through the world is “beyond potentiality and  
 
actuality” (for example, 1951:251:52).  God needs to create the world for complete  
 
blessedness, but that fulfillment does not depend on creaturely realization of certain  
 
forms over against certain other forms. (Nikkel:173ff).  Parallel to this unambiguous  
 
fulfillment in eternity beyond history’s ambiguities is an archetype for religious  
 
experiences especially evident in The Courage to Be:  In the midst of an existence at best  
 
ambiguous, an absolute meaning and fulfillment breaks through the despair, depression,  
 
and doubt, and through the forms and the substance of the finite, all of which may be lost  
 
in an abyss of meaninglessness.  The finite forms here at best represent a hope that  
 
sometime concrete meaning may yet (re)appear. In this mystical experience, we find “the  
 
courage to be,” an absolute assurance of the meaningfulness of one’s life in the absence  
 
of any concrete evidence.  One may discern here a tragic element in Tillich’s theology as  
 
well as a dialectical dimension that sounds a note of dualism.  Yes, Tillich never denies  
 
the cruciality of the finite for expression of an absolute divine meaning.  However, this  
 
absolute fulfillment appears to lose any concrete connection to our life!  Yet this is the  
 
kind of fulfillment for which a sick soul yearns.  But Tillich was hardly alone.  Did not  
 
Neo-Orthodox or Crisis Theology in the wake of the First World War typically evince a  
 
tragic as well as dialectical-tending-towards-dualistic tenor?  It should not surprise us that  
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Tillich, rooted in that era, never did find a school of art that he could unambiguously  
 
endorse as furnishing a mystical expression of the divine in tandem with an affirmation of  
 
the forms of his culture.  Today we might ask, if we have entered a new postmodern  
 
period, has or will a style of art arise that fulfills such a positive expressionist role?  Or  
 
does the postmodern signal that we must abandon any hope or pretense of a truly  
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